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The paper analyzes the welfare properties of voluntary agreements (VA) with polluters, 
when they are obtained under the legislative threat of an alternative stricter policy 
option. In the model, the threat is an abatement quota. Both the threat and its probability 
of implementation are endogenous. The latter is the outcome of a rent-seeking contest 
between a green and a polluter lobby group influencing the legislature. We show that a 
welfare-improving VA systematically emerges in equilibrium and that it is more 
efficient than the pollution quota. We also discuss various VA design aspects. 
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In the field of environmental policy, the major policy innovation of the nineties 
is probably the introduction of voluntary agreements (VA). While they were 
marginal practices in a limited number of countries beforehand (e.g. in 
Germany, Japan), they are now used almost everywhere. One illustration of 
this very fast and widespread development is the first generation of climate 
change policies adopted in OECD countries around the mid-nineties.  They 
mostly relied on voluntary agreements. Japan set the so-called Keidaren 
voluntary Action Plan covering 37 industry branches and eighty percent of 
industrial energy consumption. In the US, the Clinton's Administration 1993 
Climate Change Action Program was mainly based on voluntary programs 
including Green Lights, Climate Wise among many others. In the European 
Union, almost all Member States launched their own voluntary approaches 
under various names: branch agreements, covenants, environmental 
agreements, etc. 
  Although these approaches differ in certain respects,
 1 one common feature is 
that polluters voluntarily commit to pollution abatement activities. This use of  
the term "voluntary" has long been disputed since many agreements are in fact 
obtained under the threat of an alternative coercive public intervention.
2 The 
present paper deals with such agreements. We develop a model of voluntary 
                                          
1 We discuss the diversity of VA design in section 2. 
2 For a comprehensive review of the practice of VAs in OECD countries, see OECD 
(1999).   3
agreement in which the threat is a pollution quota and is fully endogenous. We 
use it to assess the efficiency of the VA and we discuss various design issues – 
the opportunity to involve the pollution victims in the negotiation, the 
efficiency potential of veto rights by the Congress over VAs, etc. 
  As VAs have only been developed recently and by practitioners, the 
academic literature is still limited but it is growing rapidly. Some of these 
papers deal with the case, similar to ours, where the motivation of the polluters 
to accept voluntary agreements is the preemption of future regulations. Hansen 
(1999) has developed a political economy model in which polluters negotiate 
with a regulator under a background legislative threat. The key feature of his 
model is that the regulator's objective is biased and differs from that of the 
threat-making entity, the Congress. A model by Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett 
(2000) considers firms that voluntarily abate pollution to preempt lobbying by 
consumers in favor of environmental policy. In this case, firms do no preempt 
an explicit threat by a regulator but a risk of new legislation possibly triggered 
by lobbying. These two models essentially generate positive implications 
relative to the context in which VAs are likely to emerge. The paper closest to 
ours is probably the one by Segerson and Micelli (1999). They develop a 
normative model in which the polluter undertakes voluntary action under the 
threat made by a benevolent regulator to implement an abatement quota.
3 
  We extend the Segerson & Miceli' model (S&M) in two ways. First, the 
threat is completely endogenous in our setting. In S&M, the legislative threat 
is implemented with a probability described by an exogenous parameter. This 
assumption is disputable because the probability of adoption of a given piece of 
legislation depends on its precise contents. For instance, a strict pollution 
quota is less likely to be adopted than a lenient one due to the political 
opposition of polluters. To account for that, we consider that the probability of 
adoption is the outcome of a rent-seeking contest between two lobby groups – 
the polluter and a green group – competing to influence the probability of 
adoption of the legislation. Second, contrary to S&M, we make conservative 
cost assumptions meaning that we do not confer any cost advantage to the VA 
over the regulatory quota. In our model, the VA is thus as cost effective as 
direct regulation.  
  The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In section 
                                          
3 Segerson and Miceli also investigate a so-called "carrot" approach whereby the 
polluters reduce pollution in exchange of public subsidies. Other papers focus on such 
subsidy seeking VAs; see for instance Lyon and Maxwell (2002).   4
3, the case where the threat is an abatement quota is analyzed and we show 
that the VA is systematically more efficient than the legislative abatement 
quota in this setting. Section 4 makes three simple extensions of the model to 
address design issues debated in the policy arena: the efficiency potential of 
involving a green group in VA, the impact of policy delegation on bargaining 
outcomes and the usefulness of granting a veto right to the Congress over 
newly adopted VA. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2 The  model 
 
The model depicts a situation in which a benevolent environmental regulator R 
and a polluter P agree to make a voluntary agreement. The VA specifies a 
pollution abatement level, denoted B, to be met by the polluter. Before going 
further, it is worth making two remarks. First, the model is sufficiently general 
for the polluter to be either a single firm or an industry. In practice, certain 
VAs are signed with a coalition of polluters, usually represented by an 
industrial branch association. In that case, the model implicitly assumes that 
the members of the coalition have solved the free riding problem associated 
with collective action.  
  The second remark is related to the diversity of VAs encountered in reality. 
The literature distinguishes three broad categories. Each type ultimately differs 
with respect to the degree of involvement of the regulator. Under public 
voluntary programs, the firms agree to make abatement efforts to meet goals 
which are established by the regulator. In a negotiated agreement, the polluter 
and the regulator jointly devise the commitments through bargaining. Under 
self-regulation or unilateral agreements, the polluter takes the initiative. He 
freely sets up a program of environmental actions without any formal influence 
from the regulator. 
  In our model, the agreement is the outcome of a bargaining process between 
the polluter and the regulator. So it is a negotiated agreement. However, our 
results could easily apply to public voluntary programs with minor changes. 
The reason is that public voluntary programs and negotiated agreements share 
a key feature which ultimately drives the results: the polluter and the 
regulator's participation constraints must be satisfied in both cases. On the 
contrary, self-regulation is not a possible application, the main reason being   5
probably that unilateral commitments are usually not triggered by legislative 
threats. 
  Consider now the costs and benefits associated with the polluter's 
commitment to meeting an abatement level B. The abatement cost born by the 
polluter is described by a twicely differentiable function C(B). It also generates 
a benefit in terms of avoided environmental damage. For the sake of simplicity, 
we assume that the benefit equals the abatement level B. The linearity of the 
benefit function simplifies the analysis without altering any of the results. We 
make the usual assumptions that C',  C">0,  C'(0)<1 and C(0)=0. These 
hypothesis imply that there are decreasing returns to scale in abatement 
activities, and that, for low values of B, gross welfare, denoted W(B)≡B-C(B), 
is positive. Therefore, in the absence of political constraints, the environmental 
regulator selects the optimal policy level, B*, defined as follows 
  .  '( *) 1 CB ≡
The agreement is obtained under the threat of an alternative policy. More 
specifically, we assume that the environmental regulator is the agenda setter of 
the Congress. He can thus threaten the polluter with legislation. The threat 
consists in an abatement quota. We do not assume any cost advantage for the 
VA: the polluter has the same cost function under the VA and under the 
legislative quota. Doing otherwise would make it too easy to reach conclusions 
about the superiority of voluntary agreements. 
  The threat is uncertain.
4 This is a crucial feature of this type of models: if 
the benevolent regulator was able to pass any new legislation with certainty, he 
would be able to implement the first best policy B* through the Congress and 
would have no reason to use a VA instead. Let π be this probability of 
adoption. It cannot be considered as an exogenous parameter. It certainly 
depends on the contents of the Law proposal. For instance, for a given level of 
environmental benefit, a more costly threat has lower chance of being adopted. 
One central reason for that is that the potential losers of the policy are trying 
to influence the legislative process through lobbying, media campaigns, etc. To 
account for that, we model the legislative process as follows. 
  We suppose that the proposal of legislation is subjected to a rent-seeking 
                                          
4 The fact that passing a Law is uncertain is definitively supported by evidence. During 
the last legislative term in France (1997-2002), the Government made 476 Law 
proposals out of which 351 were finally adopted by the Parliament, corresponding to 
an average probability of adoption of 0.74. In the US, a paper by Zeckhauser (1981) 
gives many examples in the field of environmental policy.   6
contest involving two lobby groups as popularized by the rent-seeking 
literature. A first group G (the "greens") is concerned by the policy benefit B 
whereas the second group is simply the polluter P who bears the policy cost 
C(B). Group G and the polluer P make rent-seeking expenditures in order to 
influence the Congress' voting process. Expenditures may be campaign 
contributions (monetary or in kind), or may correspond to the cost of 
transmitting strategic information to the "median" legislator on the 
consequences of the Law proposal. The level of expenditures of both lobby 
groups affects π, the probability of adoption, via a so-called contest success 
function. These functions are routinely used in the rent-seeking literature to 
model lobbying in noisy political environments.
5 As to the functional form, we 
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where xG and xP are the green group's and polluter's rent-seeking expenditures, 
respectively.  λ is a parameter introducing a heterogeneity in lobby groups' 
influence technology. It is a routine assumption in the rent seeking literature. 
When λ lies in between 0 and 1, the green group is less influential than the 
polluters whereas the contrary holds true beyond 1. Finally, π° is a parameter 
reflecting the responsiveness of the Congress to lobbying. As a result the 
probability π cannot fall below π°. Put differently, whatever the intensity of 
lobbying, any welfare-improving policy is adopted at least with a probability 
π°. This is a less classical assumption aiming at introducing some concern for 
the general interest in Congress' behavior. 
 
  Finally, the timing of events is as follows: 
1)  The bargaining stage: The regulator and the polluter bargain over a 
pollution abatement quota. If they agree, the game stops and the 
abatement quota is implemented. 
2) The agenda setting stage: In case of persisting disagreement, the regulator 
makes a Law proposal to the Congress 
 
5 Nitzan (1994) is a comprehensive survey of the rent-seeking literature using such 
contest success functions.   7
3) The rent-seeking stage: The lobbies simultaneously select their rent-seeking 
expenditures which determine the probability of adoption of the proposal, 
π. The Law is adopted with this probability. 
 
 
3  A VA under the threat of an abatement quota 
 
In this section, we solve the model for the case wherein the threat is a quota. 
We reason backward, starting with the analysis of the rent-seeking sub-game. 
 
3.1  The rent-seeking stage   
 
Consider any Law proposal involving an abatement quota B. What will be its 
probability of adoption? According to Eq.(1), it is determined by the rent-
seeking expenditures of the two groups. Each simultaneously and non co-
operatively selects its level of expenditures by maximizing its expected utility, 
taking the other's level of expenditures as given. The corresponding 
maximization problem is: 
 
   
max ( , )














Assuming interior solutions, the equilibrium rent-seeking expenditures are 
given by the first order conditions: 



























Algebraic manipulations of these two conditions then lead to the following 


































Plugging these expenditures in Eq. (1) yields the equilibrium probability of 
adoption of the rent-seeking game: 













3.2  The agenda-setting stage 
 
Having characterized the probability function with respect to B, we consider 
now the legislation that will be proposed to the Congress. The regulator takes 
into account the uncertainty of the adoption and makes a Law proposal that 
maximizes expected gross welfare:
6 
    max
B
[ ].  () () BB C B π −
The first order condition of this maximization problem then implicitly defines 
the abatement level under legislation, that we denote B :  ˆ
   π . (5)  ˆˆ ˆ ˆ () 1 ' () ' () () BC B B B C B π   −≡ − −    
ˆ   
We then have a very simple lemma which establishes that this level is lower 
than the first best abatement level. 
 
Lemma 1 Let  B  be the equilibrium regulatory policy under legislation. We 
have B . 
ˆ
ˆ * B <
 
Proof. First we show that π' is negative for all λ, π° and B. Differentiating (4) 
yields  [ ] ( )
2 ' () ( 1 ) () .' () / () 0 BC B B C B B C B ππ λ λ = − ° − +
ˆ B ˆ B <
<
                                        
. It follows that 
C'(B )< 1, or alternatively C'( )< C'(B*). Hence, B .  ˆ *
 
6 Note that rent-seeking activities are not an argument in the welfare function since 
they are transfers between lobby groups and others (legislators, lawyers, experts, etc.). 
The rent-seeking literature tends to consider them as wasteful activities to be included 
in the social welfare function. This does not change lemma 1 as shown in appendix. 
Therefore it has no impacts on the propositions that follow in the rest of the paper. 
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Lemma 1 states that the first best policy is not attainable under the legislative 
route. The intuition is simple. The existence of political constraints lowers the 
probability of adoption. To mitigate the problem, the environmental regulator 
needs to make a law proposal diverging from the first best optimum. This 
proposal is lower because of the negative sign of the marginal probability.  It is 
ultimately rooted in the fact that increasing B leads to larger losses in marginal 
terms than benefits due to the convexity of the cost function. It then provides 
the polluter with more incentives to increase rent-seeking expenditures. 
  It is useful to derive some simple results of comparative statics about the 
equilibrium abatement level B . From Eq.(5), one immediately derives  ˆ
  ()
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Unsurprisingly, we observe that the less responsive the Congress is to lobbying 
(a high π°), the higher the equilibrium abatement quota and the closer to the 
first best B*. Similarly, when the polluter is less efficient in rent seeking than 
the greens, the abatement level in equilibrium is higher.  
 
3.3  The bargaining stage 
 
Note that the equilibrium policy under legislation, B , corresponds to the 
disagreement point of the bargaining game, which we consider now. In this 
game, polluter and regulator's payoffs are the differences between their 
expected utility under legislation and their utility in the bargaining 
equilibrium: 
ˆ
     (Polluter's payoff) 
ˆˆ ˆ () () .() () () PP UB B C B xB C B π ≡ + −  10




   (Regulator's payoff) 
 
Given these payoffs, it is obvious that any feasible agreement is more efficient 
than legislation since it satisfies the participation constraint of the welfare-
maximizing regulator. The following result establishes the existence of a unique 
Nash bargaining solution for the game. 
 
 
Proposition 1  Let Ω ={} . There exists a unique 
Nash bargaining solution that solves the following maximization problem 
:( )0 ( )0 PR BU B U B ≥ and
 
    () ( ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ m a x () () () .() () .() () () P
B
BW B B W BB C B x B C B ππ
∈Ω
Π≡ − + −
 
Proof.  First we establish that Ω is not empty. It is convenient to denote B  
the maximal level the polluter is willing to accept and B  the minimal level 
the regulator is ready to accept. They are implicitly defined by 
 and UB . 
We have W(B ) =  <WB  since W"( )=-C"( )< 0. Then 
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 < π(B )  since W  is strictly  increasing below 
B*. And so C(BR) < C(π(B ) ) < π(B )C(B ) since C' and C" are strictly 
positive.  Hence, C (BR)+xP( ) < π(B )C(B )+xP(B )=C(BP). Since xP(B )>0, 
we finally obtain that C(BR)< C(BP) and thus BR< BP. Hence, Ω =[BR, BP] ≠ 
∅. 
  The second step of the proof is to show that the Nash product is strictly 
concave. This is straightforward since the second derivative of the Nash 
product,  , is strictly negative.  " () " () () 2' () ' () " () () PR B W BU B C BW B C BU B Π = −−
 Finally,  let  h be the function describing the utility the regulator obtains for 
a given utility level of the polluter uP. The last step of the proof consists in 
establishing that h  is strictly decreasing and concave. From the strict 
monotonicity of UP, there exists a unique abatement level B

 ∈ Ω such that 




 = Uu, where U  denotes the inverse utility of the 





P is then 
given by: 
  ,   () ()
11 ˆˆ ˆ () ( ) () ( ) ( PP P P P P P P hu U B U U u C K u u BB x B π −− ≡ == − + −−
 ˆ )  11
where  . Having characterized h, we can now study the 
sign of its first and second derivatives. We have: 
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== −   .  
 
From  B  < B*, it follows C'( ) < 1 and thus  ˆ ˆ B 0
P du < dh . Hence h is strictly 
decreasing. The second derivative is obviously negative  and h is therefore 
strictly concave.  
 
 
Proposition 1 is the first key result of this paper. It establishes the existence of 
a VA that is more efficient than the legislative (regulatory) option. The result 
is very robust in that it does not depend on the stringency of the political 
constraints, as reflected by the values of λ and π°. In particular, it still holds 
true when the Congress is very weakly responsive to lobbies' pressure (π°→ 1) 
or when the polluter is much less efficient than the green group in influencing 
the Congress (λ → +∞). However, the VA cannot yield the first best optimum 
as stated by this simple corollary.   
  
Corollary 1  Let   be the  abatement level corresponding to the Nash 




Proof. Obvious since B  < BP < B  < B*.  ˆ
 
 
What is the intuition underlying proposition 1? In fact the key point in the 
proof is that the maximal abatement level the polluter is willing to accept, B , 
is lower than the minimal level of abatement for the regulator B . One reason 
for this is the fact that signing a VA provides a specific benefit for the polluter 
which lowers his reservation level: avoiding the rent-seeking expenditure x . 
This is not the crucial reason, however, since  would remain below   even 
if  was equal to zero. The key point lies in the convexity of the cost 
function as illustrated by Figure 1. It represents the case  , 
or equivalently CB . This case is not very favorable to the joint 
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() BC ππ <
() ( P WB < ) R  12
the threat for the polluter is less than the expected gain for the regulator. In 
this situation, we might fear that the maximal abatement level acceptable for 
the polluter to be lower than the minimal level acceptable by the regulator. In 
fact, this is not the case as shown in Figure 1: we have  because C is 
convex and W is concave. 
R BB < P
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4 Design  issues 
 
Having shown that the VA systematically dominates regulation in a second 
best world where legislative action is constrained by lobby groups' influence, we 
use the model to analyze three design issues that arise in the policy debate on 
VAs: the efficiency potential of involving environmental associations in the 
negotiation, the impact of policy delegation on bargaining outcomes, and the 
interest of an ex post veto right of the Congress over any new VA.
 7 
 
7 A recent report published by OECD study makes a comprehensive review of these 
issues (OECD, 2000).   13
 
4.1  Associating the green group to the VA 
  
A frequent criticism is that VAs exclude the pollution victims from the 
negotiation. In this respect, they diverge from classical Coasean bargaining 
since not all affected parties are around the table. The Coase theorem then 
suggests that it would improve welfare to include them in the process. The 
involvement of green associations in the negotiation of VAs is a recurrent 
policy recommendation even though it rarely happens in practice (OECD, 
2000). Does our model plead for such a recommendation? To answer the 
question, it is necessary to compare the bargaining outcome of the traditional 
2-party VA analyzed in the previous section,  , with that of the 3-party VA 
game involving a green group representing the victims. The payoff to the green 
group in the bargaining game is 
B 
   
ˆˆ ˆ () () . () GG UB B B B xB π ≡− −
No simple equilibrium concept is available for 3-player bargaining games 
without side payments. To bypass the problem, we assume that bargaining 
only takes place between the two lobby groups. The environmental regulator 
only influences the outcome through his participation constraint which still 
needs to hold. Hence, he has no bargaining power and plays a role of arbitrator 
(or facilitator) of the negotiation. This hypothesis about the allocation of 
bargaining power actually corresponds to that of a Coasean negotiation.  With 
this assumption the maximization problem of the three-player game is: 
   
max ( ) ( ). ( ) ter P G
B
BU B U B
∈Γ
Π≡
where  . The following result establishes the existence of 
the bargaining outcome of the three-player game and states that it is more 
efficient than the traditional bilateral VA. 
{ :( )0 G BU B Γ = ≥∩ } Ω
 
 
Proposition 2.  There exists a unique abatement level, denoted B , which is 




 < B* for any λ and π°, 
implying that the 3-party VA is more efficient than the traditional one. 
   14
Proof.   Establishing the existence and uniqueness of   follows closely 
the proof of Proposition 1 and is thus left in appendix. As regards the second 
part of the proposition, consider the Nash product of the 3-party VA game: 
B 
 
2 ˆˆ ˆ () () () .() () () ter P BBB C B x B C B π   Π = Π ++ −      
Its first derivative is  . As   
is the maximum of Π(B), then Π'(B )=0. Hence we have Π
ˆˆ ˆ ' () ' () 2 ( (() .() () ) () ) ' () ter BB B C B l B C B C π Π = Π− + −





= , which is strictly negative. It implies 
< <B*.  





Proposition 2 establishes that the involvement of green groups in VAs is a 
relevant policy recommendation. This is so because, in the case of a simple VA 
excluding the green group, the participants are the polluter – who only cares 
about abatement costs - and the regulator – who is concerned with both costs 
and benefits. In this setting, the cost is taken into account twice in bargainers' 
payoffs while the benefit is only counted once. This is reflected in the 
bargaining outcome which places more weight on the cost side. Involving the 
greens - who are only concerned with the benefit - suppresses this distortion 
since costs and benefits are both taken into account twice in participants' 
payoffs.  
 
4.2    Delegating the negotiation of VA 
 
The intuition behind proposition 2 is the starting point for discussing a further 
design aspect. In practice, the government often delegates the negotiation of 
VAs to specialized environmental agencies (e.g., the EPA in the US) or 
Ministries of the Environment. In comparison with the ideal benevolent 
regulator of the basic model, it is reasonable to assume that these entities are 
biased in favour of the environment. The model can illustrate the fact that 
such a policy delegation and the bias it introduces in the objective of the 
bargaining regulator in fact promote the efficiency of the VA. Put differently, 
an inefficient regulator leads to more efficient VA outcomes. The reason is the 
same as the one supporting the involvement of the greens in VAs. A pro-
environment regulator pays more attention to the benefit than to cost, 
resulting in a more efficient bargaining outcome. Let us investigate this point.   15
  Consider that, for efficiency purposes, the benevolent regulator delegates VA 
bargaining to a biased agency denoted A. To organize the delegation 
relationship, he devises a contract, which specifies the bias. More specifically, 
the delegation contract attributes to the bargaining agency the following 
objective function 
  βB – (1-β)C(B)                with  [ ] 0,1 ∈ β  
The bias is reflected by the parameter β which equals 0, if the contract requires 
the agency to care only about abatement cost, and 1, if the contract requires 
paying only attention to environmental benefit. We assume that the delegation 
contract is perfectly enforceable. More generally, we neglect all the transaction 
costs potentially attached to policy delegation. The question we address is then 
as follows: what should be the bias β* so that the bargaining outcome 
maximizes social welfare?  
  There is a simple way to answer the question by considering the 
participation constraints. Keeping the notations previously introduced, the 
maximal level the polluter is willing to accept, B , and the minimal level for 
the bargaining agency,  , are now given by: 
P
Bβ
  . (6)  ˆˆ ˆ () ( ) . ( ) ( ) () PP P P UB B C B xB C B π ≡ + − = 0
)    (7)  ( ˆˆ ˆ () ( 1 ) () ( ) ( 1 ) ( ) 0 A UB B C B B B C B ββ β ββ π β β ≡− − − − − =
 
Note that the threat policy B  is the same as before since the benevolent 
regulator is still the agenda-setter of the Congress. Assume that there exists an 




β < P B  and B  ∈   [ ] , P BB β . From Eq. (6), we see that BP does 
not depend on β. Hence, modifying the bias will not affect the upper bound of 
the interval [ ] , P BB β . It only influences the lower bound. Moreover, we know 
from proposition 1 that B < B*.  Hence the VA equilibrium abatement level 
is thus necessarily below the first best level. In this context, the higher   
and the closer to the first best B*, the more efficient the VA. In particular, if 
we are able to show that there exists a bias β such that B = B
P
B  B 

P, we would 
have characterized the efficient bias β*. In fact, this bias exists and is given by 
   (8)  P BB β =
This is so because, in this case, the bargaining set is restricted to one point and   16
we are sure that B = B 




















We are then able to establish the following result. 
 
Proposition 3 The  efficient  bias,  β*, of the VA delegation contract is such 
that  . The bargaining agency is thus biased in favor of the 
environment. 
*1 / β >
 
Proof.   From Eq.(6), we know that CB  and is 
thus positive. It follows that the legislative quota is less costly in terms of 
expected abatement cost than the VA. Put differently, gross VA abatement 
cost relative to the legislation is negative. Since the VA is overall welfare 
improving, the environmental benefit of the VA relative to the legislation 
 is necessarily positive and higher in absolute terms than the 
associated gross abatement cost, that is: BB . This 
inequality implies that the last term of Eq.(9) is strictly inferior to ½. Hence 
>½. 
ˆˆ ˆ ( ) ()() () PP BCB x B π − =
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ () ()() ( PP B B C B C ππ − > −
ˆˆ () P BB π −
* β
) B
    
 
This proposition essentially relies on the same intuition as the one justifying 
the involvement of the green group in the VA. A pro-environment bias 
compensates for the polluter's bias in favor of the abatement cost and then 
leads the bargaining outcome to be more efficient in the end. This proposition 
has institutional implications: VA negotiation should be preferably delegated to 
environmental agencies. There exist instances where VA are in fact delegated 
to the ministries or agencies in charge of industrial or economic affairs. The 
Dutch CO2 Long Term Agreements is an example. Our model suggests that it 
is not the best choice. 
 
   17
4.3    Granting a veto right to the Congress 
 
A further design question refers to the interest of granting a veto right to the 
Congress over every new VA. Belgium or the Netherlands are countries which 
have already adopted this rule. The underlying rationale is to compensate for 
the lack of democratic legitimacy of the VA process as compared to traditional 
legislative action. Is it justified on economic efficiency grounds? In our setting, 
it adds a further (veto) stage to the sequential game. At this final stage, we 
must assume that, like any proposal made in the Congress, the adoption of the 
VA is the subject of a further rent-seeking contest between the two lobby 
groups. 
  Basically, there is no difference with the rent-seeking sub-game analyzed in 
section 3.1. The probability that the VA is definitively adopted is therefore 
equal to   given by Eq.(4) and the corresponding rent-seeking expenditures 
are   and   for the polluter and the green group, respectively given 
by Eq.(2) and Eq.(3). Moving on to the bargaining sub-game, the bargainers' 
payoffs are now: 
() B π
) B ( P x () G xB
   
ˆˆ ˆ () ()() () ()() () PP
P UB B C B xB B C B xB ππ =+ −−
    ˆˆ () ()() ()() R UB B W B B W B ππ = −
 
We then have the following proposition: 
 
 
Proposition 4    When the Congress enjoys a veto right, no VA emerges 
in equilibrium. 
 
Proof. Keeping  using  B  to denote the minimal level the regulator is 
ready to accept, defined by . The left-hand side and 
the right-hand side of this condition have the same functional form. 
Furthermore   is strictly monotonic below  . Hence B  =B . 
R
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Consider now   defined by  . The 
same argument applies to establish that   = B  if   is 
monotonic. To show that this is the case, consider the Nash product 
. If there exists a VA, we have 
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thus UB . Therefore,  is monotonic 
and   =B . In the end, B =B  and the bargaining set is restricted to the 
disagreement point. 
' () (()() () ) ' 0 P B C B x B π = − +
P B ˆ
P R
P < (.). (.) (.) P Cx π +
 
 
Therefore, introducing a veto right damages social welfare, preventing VAs 
from emerging in equilibrium. Intuitively, this is so because, in the absence of 
veto right, the gains for both sides are ultimately rooted in bypassing the 
legislative route. Offering a veto on the result of the negotiation de facto re-
introduces the legislative option in the VA route. As a result, the interest for 
making a VA vanishes for both parties.   
 
 
5 Conclusion     
 
We have developed a model of voluntary agreement under legislative threat 
wherein the regulator sets the threat while its probability of adoption is the 
outcome of a rent-seeking contest between the polluter and a green group 
influencing the legislature. The model demonstrates that, in this setting, the 
VA is systematically more efficient than the threat abatement quota.  
  We also use the model to analyze a set of design issues that are frequently 
discussed in the policy arena.  First, it is shown that involving a green group in 
the negotiation of the VA improves welfare. The underlying intuition is that 
this (partly) compensates for the bias in favor of pollution abatement cost 
attached to the participation of the polluter in the VA decision process. The 
same intuition applies for the second extension of the model, which considers 
the interest for the benevolent regulator to delegate the negotiation of the VA 
to a biased agency. Such a delegation frequently takes place in practice when 
the responsibility for developing VA lies upon specialized environmental 
agencies or ministries. We demonstrate that this strategy improves welfare if 
the agency is biased in favor of the environment. The last extension of the 
model assesses the relevancy of granting a veto right to the Congress over each 
new VA as done in certain countries (e.g., Belgium, the Netherlands). The 
model demonstrates that this prevents the emergence of any welfare-improving 
VA. 
  All in all, these results are quite favorable to voluntary agreements in   19
comparison with the traditional Command and Control approach. It should 
however be noted that potential drawbacks of the approach are not taken into 
account in this modeling exercise. For instance, the polluters perfectly comply 
with their commitments in the model whereas many commitments are in fact 
non-binding in reality. Furthermore, the model does not address free riding 
issues which can hinder the emergence of VAs when, as it is frequent in 
practice, they involve a group of polluters.  A further limit providing the 
opportunity for future work is that we only consider a threat consisting in an 
abatement quota. It would be interesting to consider more efficient policy 
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Proof of lemma 1 when when rent-seeking is wasteful   
If the regulator considers that rent-seeking is a wasteful activity, it enters 
negatively in his objective function and he maximizes 
   [ ] () () () () GP BB C B xB xB π −−−, 
which leads to    
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ˆ B , the welfare maximizing regulatory policy under legislation, still 
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Proof of Proposition 2 
First we show that Γ is non-empty. Let BG denote the abatement level 
corresponding to the green group's participation constraint, that is 
. We use the notation as in proposition 1 for 
the abatement levels corresponding to the polluter's and regulator's 
participation constraints, B and  respectively. Proposition 1 has already 
established that B
ˆˆ ˆ () ( ) ( ) GG G G UB B B B xB π ≡− − =
P
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ () () /() GG xB B xBC B =
ˆˆ ˆ () ( ) . ( ) ( ) ( PP P UB B C B xB C B π =+ −
R B
) P =
R<BP.  Therefore, for Γ to be non-empty only requires that 
BG<BP, i.e., the polluter's and green group's participation constraints jointly 
hold. From UG(BG)=0, we derive that xB  since 
. Plugging   in 
, we obtain that CB  
and thus 
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ () () ( ()) / PG C B B B BB π = −
ˆ () G xB
() ( ) CB = () ˆˆ /. PG B B
( ) ˆˆ () / ( ) / ( PP B CB B =
ˆˆ () / ( ) / PP B CB B <
/ P B) G CB . From B B P < B  and C"> 0, it follows 
that CB . Hence B
ˆ
G<BP. Γ is thus non-empty. 
 Second it is straightforward to show that the Nash product is strictly 
concave:  <0. Last, we need to establish the 
existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. If g denotes the green group' 
utility, we have to show that it is a strictly decreasing and concave function of 
" () " () () 2' () G BC B U B C Π = −− B  22
ˆ )
ˆ B
the polluter's utility uP. We have: 
   ,  () ()
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where KB . The first and second derivative are respectively:   ˆˆ ˆ ()() () P C B x π =+
  1 ˆˆ '( ) 1/ '( )
P
dg




3 ˆ 2/ '( )
P
dg
du CB = − , 
which are both strictly negative. Therefore the Nash bargaining solution exists 
and is unique.  
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